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Signaling Credit Risk in Agriculture:
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Signaling is an important element in the lender-borrower relationship that influences the
cost and availability of debt capital to agricultural borrowers. This paper analyzes the
effects of signaling on farm capital structure in conjunction with the pecking order and
trade-off theories. The aggregate estimation indicates that signaling does affect agricultural
credit relationships through measures of past cash flow and profitability. High-quality
borrowers achieve greater credit capacity by providing lenders with valid signals of their
financial status, while adjusting toward target debt levels over time and following the
pecking order relationship in the short run.
Key Words: farm businesses, pecking order theory, signaling theory, trade-off theory
JEL Classifications: G11, G32, Q14
Signaling is an important element in the
lender-borrower relationship that directly in-
fluences the cost and availability of debt
capital to agricultural borrowers. It is based
on the premise that lenders prefer to finance
higher-quality borrowers with lower credit
risk. In determining a borrower’s credit
capacity, lenders need information that allows
them to accurately distinguish between high-
and low-quality borrowers, thus minimizing
adverse selection problems. High-quality bor-
rowers strive to inform lenders of their status
by sending credible, unambiguous, and mean-
ingful signals. In contrast, low-quality bor-
rowers are unable to send such signals.
Although signaling is a generic strategy
applicable to many types of relationships, the
signaling instruments for financial relation-
ships rely on measures of strong financial
performance (e.g., high profitability and cash
flow) that strengthen risk ratings made by
financial institutions.
Thesensitivity offarmers’ credit capacityto
various financial characteristics and risk man-
agement was conceptualized by Baker, empir-
ically tested in several studies, and found to
differ significantly among such factors as
farmers’ use of crop insurance, forward
contracting, choice of lender, financing instru-
ment, income variability, asset structure, en-
terprise mix, and degree of vertical coordina-
tion (Barry and Robison). These studies are
consistent with the signaling paradigm to
various degrees, although Baker’s approach
was motivated primarily by liquidity consider-
ations, while more recent studies have empha-
sized agency relationships, asymmetric infor-
mation, and incentive alignments between
borrowers and lenders (Hart; Hubbard; Jensen
and Meckling). The results of these studies
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credit capacity in the capital structure analysis
of farm businesses (Barry and Ellinger).
Signaling also interacts with other dimen-
sions of capital structure theory. Past econo-
metric studies have concluded, for example,
that the pecking order and trade-off (target or
partial adjustment) theories contribute signif-
icantly and jointly to understanding the
capital structure of corporate firms (Fama
and French; Shyman-Sunder and Myers;
Vogt). Barry, Bierlen, and Sotomayor (2000)
observed that farm businesses may follow a
pecking order in adjusting to changes in or
deviations from long-run targets on capital
structure. Myers (2003), who originated the
pecking order theory in 1984, suggested that
joint consideration of the pecking order and
trade-off theories is insightful but may fall
short of explaining innovations and advance-
ments in corporate finance (e.g., convertible
debt, options, and stock repurchases).
Signaling strategies should be considered
together with the joint effects of the pecking
order and trade-off theories to more com-
pletely reflect the capital structure effects.
Joint consideration will combine the borrow-
er’s side of the financing transaction with the
credit cost and capacity issues on the lender’s
side. The latter considers how the lender’s
evaluation of the borrower’s credit capacity
responds to changes in financial conditions,
new investments, and other financial charac-
teristics of farm businesses.
The goal of this study is to systematically
examine the financial effects of signaling on
the farm’s credit capacity and investment
conditions, while jointly considering the im-
plications of the traditional trade-off and
pecking order theories of capital structure.
Joint consideration of these theories combines
the borrower’s capital structure decisions with
the lender’s determination of borrower’s credit
capacity, thus encompassing both sides in the
lender-borrower relationship. Our method
applies a simultaneous equation system to
Illinois farm-level data. The results clearly
support the hypothesized signaling results.
That is, high-quality borrowers achieve great-
er credit capacity by providing lenders with
valid signals of their financial status, while
adjusting toward target debt levels over time
and following the pecking order relationship
in the short run.
Farm Businesses and Capital
Structure Theories
Farm businesses generally present a less
complex setting for capital structure than do
large corporate firms. Ownership and man-
agement are concentrated in one or a few
individuals who may have family or commu-
nity ties. Internal equity and debt are the
major financing alternatives, while external
equity and direct access to capital markets are
beyond the reach of most farms. Nonetheless,
capital intensity of farm businesses is high,
production cycles can be lengthy and seasonal,
life cycle effects are present, and rates of
return on assets are relatively low and volatile.
Currently prevalent capital structure studies
have primarily included the pecking order and
trade-off theories. Originally developed by
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf, the
pecking order theory considers market imper-
fections in the form of asymmetric information
between firms and capital markets about
presently held assets and investment opportu-
nities. Under the pecking order theory, firms
use internal funds (e.g., free cash flow) first
because they are less costly than external funds.
When external funds are used, the sequence is
debt followed by equity, reflecting the ordering
of costs, although external equity (e.g., issuing
shares) is seldom used. These ideas were
formulated into testable hypotheses and con-
firmed by many studies, including Baskin,
Hubbard, and Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn.
The trade-off theory predicts a target debt
ratio that depends on the costs and benefits of
financial leverage. Benefits of higher leverage
include the tax deductibility of interest paid
and the use of debt to indicate high-quality
performance induced by managerial efforts to
meet the financial obligations. Costs of higher
leverage include the greater likelihood of
liquidation and its associated costs, and
agency costs due to borrowers’ incentives to
take actions that are detrimental to lenders. If
806 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2008adjustment to a changing target is costly, the
theory implies that a partial adjustment model
is appropriate. Partial adjustments arise pri-
marily because of market imperfections that
prevent firms from fully adjusting when
capital structure deviates from its target and,
thus, prevent optimal funding of new invest-
ments. The optimal debt target is not observed
directly and likely varies over time. Early tests
of target models include Jalilvand and Harris
and Taggart. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman
conducted a more extensive search for evi-
dence of target-adjustment financing; they
found that management acts to move the firm
toward a target debt ratio, and the target
depends on characteristics of the firm.
In agricultural capital markets, asymmetric
information prevents lenders from completely
distinguishing financial health among diverse
farm borrowers. Although lenders tend to
require similar types of information from
borrowers, the quality, completeness, and
extent of documentation they provide may
vary widely. In addition, some lenders, espe-
cially the U.S. Farm Credit System, rely
heavily on credit bureau scores and limited
financial data for smaller loan sizes. Thus,
good-quality farmers have incentives to con-
vey their advantageous credit risk information
to lenders through credible signals. Especially
important is the information about key
financial factors, such as profitability, repay-
ment capacity, solvency, and liquidity. Effec-
tive use of risk management practices, mar-
keting alternatives, and educational programs
are other signaling examples, although their
effects are more difficult to measure and
evaluate (Miller et al.).
Signaling theory applied to finance was
developed by several authors, including Dia-
mond, Ross, and Spence. A credible signal can
distinguish a high-quality firm from a low-
quality firm, if the latter is unable to mimic the
signal or finds it too costly to do so. Ross
showed how debt could serve as a costly signal
that separates different classes of firms. Sig-
naling of higher debt by managers implies an
optimistic earnings environment and evidence
of a high-quality firm, while a low-quality firm
would want to avoid discovery. Most of the
conceptual work on signaling is in corporate
finance, followed by a large body of applica-
tion related to the use of signals by lenders to
evaluate start-up firms, entrepreneurial re-
search, and small business (Backes-Gellner
and Werner; Levine and Hughes; Voordeckers
and Steijvers). Shenoy and Koch tested the
pecking order and signaling theories using past
earnings and cash flow as the signals for
corporate firms. They found significant evi-
dence in support of both theories, although
they did not consider the trade-off theory.
Conceptualizing and Empirical Modeling of
Capital Structure Theories
Financing Costs Affect Farm Capital Structure
The characteristics of the signaling, pecking
order, and trade-off theories summarized
above can be conceptualized in terms of a
model that reflects the weighted average cost
of capital for a farm business. Each of the
theories emphasizes different relationships
among these costs, although their distinct
effects can be modeled contemporaneously
through alternative types and time dimensions
of financial capital. Among these dimensions
are debt versus equity capital, short- versus
long-term debt, current versus noncurrent
equity, and both the lender’s and the borrow-
er’s contributions to the costs of debt capital.
Consider that the objective of farm busi-
ness financing is to minimize the weighted















z iSD ðÞ SD=A ðÞ ½
z iLD ðÞ LD=A ðÞ   1 { t ðÞ ,
with assumptions of
iCurEq v iSD v iLD v iNCurEq,
iSD ~ iL SD z iB SD,
iLD ~ iL LD z iB LD,
iL LR v iL HR:
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A are the respective ratios of current equity,
noncurrent equity, and short- and long-term
debt to assets, with iCurEq, iNCurEq, iSD,a n diLD
as their corresponding financing costs. Here
iL_SD, iB_SD, iL_LD,a n diB_LD are short- and
long-term debt components from lender’s side
and borrower’s side, and iL_HR and iL_LR are
the lender’s interest rates for high- and low-
risk borrowers.
Current equity is defined as current assets
minus current liabilities, or the traditional
measure of working capital. Included are the
net cash flow from operations and investment,
and the net changes in short- and long-term
debt. Current assets also include liquid hold-
ings of farm inventories and other financial
assets. Noncurrent equity is the difference
between noncurrent assets (e.g., machinery,
land, and buildings) and noncurrent liabilities,
mostly comprised of intermediate and long-
term debt. Short-term debt should be paid off
within one year while long-term debt is paid
off over multiple years, thus experiencing the
higher risk position.
Under the pecking order theory, the short-
term financing cost relationship is dominated
by iCurEq , iSD , iLD, indicating that the cost
of current equity (internal funds) is less than
the cost of external debt capital. Internal funds
likely have opportunity costs (e.g., debt
repayment, nonfarm investment), but debt
has the higher transaction costs. The result
of these cost relationships is the pecking order
preference in the short run for first using less
costly internal funds until they are depleted or
at minimum liquidity levels, and then consid-
ering external funds.
Over the long run, the financing cost
relationship implied in the trade-off theory is
primarily characterized by iSD , iLD ,
iNCurEq, reflecting the tax shield of interest
payments on debt and the higher risk position
of the equity holder (i.e., lenders have first
claim on the borrower’s cash flow and asset
values in the event of default and foreclosure).
Moreover, the traditional view in finance
theory is that the costs of both debt and
equity will eventually increase as leverage
increases because of greater financial risk for
both parties (Brealey, Franklin, and Myers).
The result is a minimum weighted average cost
of capital, at some level or range of leverage,
which becomes the target level.
The signaling effect is reflected, in princi-
ple, through the credit risk assessment and
loan pricing polices of the lender. By sending
credible, unambiguous signals, lower-risk bor-
rowers achieve lower credit risk premiums
than higher-risk borrowers (iL_LR , iL_HR).
Farm financing costs (iSD, iLD) are determined
by both the lender and the borrower. The
lender’s component of debt costs (iL_SD, iL_LD)
includes the cost of funds acquired from the
financial market, administrative costs, and
credit risk expressed as an anticipated loss
rate. These components comprise the rate of
interest on debt. The borrower’s cost (iB_SD,
iB_LD) of external funds, over and above the
interest rate, includes less observable transac-
tion and agency costs for relationship build-
ing, financial documentation, reporting re-
quirements, communications time, potential
loss of control through covenants attached to
loan agreements, and uncertainties about
contract performance.
All these elements of financing costs are
not directly observable for the empirical
analysis. Absent from the data source are
explicit observations of costs of equity and
interest rates on various types of debt.
However, the effects of these costs on changes
in levels of investment (INV) and types of
financial capital will allow clear linkages
between the conceptualization presented
above and the econometric tests of the three
theories. To show these relationships, consider
a firm’s accounting Statement of Cash Flows
that is categorized in terms of its operating,
investing, and financing activities, within a
given accounting period. In summary form,
this statement shows that total net cash flow is
the sum of net cash flows from the operating
(CF), investing (INV), and financing activities,
where financing may be classified into the
changes in short-term debt (SD) and long-
term debt (LD). The contemporaneous and
interactive effects of these activities can be
expressed as a set of simultaneous dependen-
cies among each of the variables, which are
808 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2008designated as
ð2:1Þ CF ~ f INV,SD,LD ðÞ ,
ð2:2Þ INV ~ fC F ,SD,LD ðÞ ,
ð2:3Þ SD ~ fC F ,INV,LD ðÞ ,
ð2:4Þ LD ~ fC F ,INV,SD ðÞ :
That is, a farm’s investment capital in
Equation (2.2) is associated with the net cash
flows from operations and changes in short-
and long-term debt, and so on.
Conceptually, changes in the financing
costs expressed in the weighted average cost
of capital equation can be related to changes
in the respective components of total net cash
flow. Under the pecking order theory, for
example, the effects in Equations (2.1) and
(2.2) of lower costs of internal funds would be
an increase in the use of internal funds (CF)
and a reduction in use of debt (SD, LD)t o
finance investments (INV). In contrast, the
cost relationships under the trade-off theory
would result in an increased use of both
internal funds and debt to finance new
investments, thus maintaining the target level
of leverage. Similarly, the cost effects of
favorable signals should result in lower costs
of debt capital and allow relatively greater
debt use and larger investments. The empirical
model to follow is based on joint modeling of
the relationships in Equations (2.1)–(2.4), with
additional refinements to accommodate data
availability, the partial adjustment process,
structuring of alternative types of debt, the
specific signaling instruments, and other spec-
ifications for estimating a system of equations.
Empirical Modeling
Based on previous studies and the conceptual
discussion, we develop a simultaneous equa-
tion system composed of cash flow, invest-
ment, short-term debt, and long-term debt
equations to systematically investigate wheth-
er signaling theory works well with the
pecking order and trade-off theories, and
jointly apply to farm businesses. The formu-
lation follows that of other finance studies
(Barry, Bierlen, and Sotomayor; Shenoy and
Koch), in which an investment equation
interacts with financial equations for cash
flow and debt to motivate the respective
relationships among the variables and to drive
the need for capital structure decisions. The
simultaneous equations are as follows:
ð3:1Þ
CFt ~ a0 z a1SDt z a2SDt { 1
z a3LDt z a4LDt { 1
z a5INVt z a6INVt { 1
z a7ROAt z a8ROAt { 1
z a9FM z a10YR z e1t,
ð3:2Þ
INVt ~ b0 z b1SDt z b2SDt { 1
z b3LDt z b4LDt { 1
z b5CFt z b6CFt { 1
z b7ROAt z b8ROAt { 1
z b9FM z b10YR z e2t,
ð3:3Þ
SDt ~ c0 z c1CFt z c2CFt { 1
z c3INVt z c4INVt { 1
z c5ROAt z c6ROAt { 1
z c7LDt z c8 SD
1
t { SSDt { 1

z c9FM z c10YR z e3t,
ð3:4Þ
LDt ~ d0 z d1CFt z d2CFt { 1
z d3INVt z d4INVt { 1
z d5ROAt z d6ROAt { 1
z d7SDt z d8 LD
1
t { SLDt { 1

z d9FM z d10YR z e4t,
where CFt is the cash flow at time t,a n dCFt21
is lagged cash flow, and SDt, LDt,a n dINVt
represent net short-term debt, long-term debt,
and investment in year t, respectively. Short-
and long-term debt are measured as the
difference between the end- and beginning-
of-year stock variables to obtain flow mea-
sures of each year’s financial performance.





are the targets of short- and long-term
debt levels, and SSDt21 and SLDt21 are
stock variables of short- and long-term
debt from the previous period. Therefore,
SD
1




t { SLDt { 1

mea-
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debt from their targets. FM and YR represent
farm-specific and year dummies, respectively.
In this equation system, variables are divided
by total farm assets at the beginning of the
year, with the exception of ROA, FM,a n d
YR.
Following Vogt, target financial ratios can
be separated into two components: one that
varies with time (due to changing interest rates
or lack of information about inflation rates)
and another that varies cross-sectionally (due
to industry and firm-level influences). Infor-
mation about the true target ratios will be
captured by the dummy variables for year and
farm and thus are reflected in their contribu-
tions to the constant term of each equation.
Error terms are assumed to be independent,
identically distributed random variables with
mean of zero, variance var eit ðÞ ~ s2
i, covari-
ances cov(eit, eit21) 5 0 and cov(eit, ejt) ? 0f o r
i, j 5 1, 2, 3, 4.
A farm’s cash flow is the total net cash
provided by farm operations and investing
activities(excludingdebttransactions).Because
investment funds are derived partially from
internally generated cash flow, we consider the
net cash provided by both types of activities in
order to match the implication by the pecking
ordertheory.Netcashfromoperatingactivities
is calculated as the sum of farm operating
receiptsand net nonfarm income,lesscashpaid
for operating expenses, interest, market live-
stock and feed, family living, and income and
self-employment taxes. Net cash from investing
activities is the cash generated by the sale of
breeding livestock, machinery, equipment,
buildings, securities, and real estate and invest-
ment/fund transfers, less cash paid for the
purchase of breeding livestock, machinery,
equipment, buildings, securities, and real estate
and investment/fund transfers.
Short-term debt is current liabilities, which
include short-term operating notes, commod-
ity credit corporation loans, feed accounts
payable, lease payments, accounts payable
with merchants and dealers, estimated accrued
tax liabilities, accrued interest, and principal
due within 12 months for intermediate and
long-term notes. Long-term debt includes
intermediate and long-term liabilities. Inter-
mediate liabilities include intermediate notes
and life insurance policy loans, while long-
term liabilities include real estate mortgages
and contracts. Investment (INV)i sm a i n l y
composed of two parts: (1) machinery and
building purchases and (2) land purchase and
improvements, since these activities are the
main types of investment expenditures for the
crop farms in our study. Return on assets
(ROA) is measured by the net return on the
market value of assets.
The Applicability of the Pecking Order and
Trade-off Theories for Farm Businesses
An important econometric issue arises because
the pecking order theory considers a financing
deficit to be exogenous, and financing with
debt is more expensive than using internal cash
flow. Cash flow, short-term debt, and long-
term debt simultaneously affect each other and
are influenced by the investment. Farms
encountering a good investment opportunity
will first draw from their internal cash flow,
followed by debt, to finance projects. Thus, the
contemporaneous relationship at time t be-
tween cash flow (CFt) and leverage (SDt, LDt)
would yield the evidence of pecking order
behavior. Negative contemporaneous relation-
ships between cash flow and short- and long-
term debt imply a higher level of borrowing
when internal cash flow is lower, and less
borrowing with a higher internal cash flow.
Furthermore, we expect a larger impact on
cash flow variables from short-term debt (SDt)
than from long-term debt (LDt)u n l e s sl o n g -
term investment conditions are highly favor-
able. These contemporaneous relationships are
expressed in the cash flow, short-term debt,
and long-term debt equations.
In a more complex version of the pecking
ordertheory,Myers (1984)statedthatfirmsare
concerned with both current and future financ-
ing costs. Balancing these costs, firms that
anticipate large future investment will maintain
low-risk debt capacity in order to avoid
foregoing future investments or financing them
with new risky securities. Thus, controlling for
other effects, firms with larger expected invest-
810 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2008ment may have lower current leverage. We
incorporate this idea into the investment
equation by observing the relationship between
investments (INVt), lagged short-term debt
(SDt21), and lagged long-term debt (LDt21).
A negative dynamic relationship suggests that
farms will keep short- and long-term debt
levels lower in the current time period in order
to avoid larger financing costs in the future.
Trade-off studies in corporate finance
focus on the trade-off between actual capital
structure and their corresponding target levels
for long-term debt, short-term debt, new
equity, and dividends. Our study extends the
trade-off theory in two ways. First, we
examine the ‘‘exogenous adjustment,’’ which
implies a partial adjustment of short- and
long-term debt to their respective target levels
(SD
* 2 SSDt21 and LD
* 2 SLDt21). The
target level is generally determined by exoge-
nous factors, such as interest rate, business
size, and market situation (Jalilvand and
Harris). We test for exogenous adjustment
by observing the debt deviation variables: if, in
the previous time period, farmers borrow less
than the target levels, they may increase their
debt in the following period, allowing them to
benefit from paying lower taxes. Positive
dynamic relationships between SDt and
SSDt21, and between LDt and SLDt21,a r e
expected in the short- and long-term debt
equations, respectively.
Our second extension of the trade-off
theory is an ‘‘endogenous trade-off.’’ Because
the structure of debt is as important as the
level of debt to farm businesses, the internal
balance between short-term debt (SDt)a n d
long-term debt (LDt) must be considered. The
endogenous trade-off predicts a negative
simultaneous relationship between short- and
long-term debt, with an appropriate debt
structure not only lowering the borrowing
cost but also increasing farm financial
strength, such as its liquidity.
Adding Signaling Theory in the Lender-
Borrower Relationships
High-quality farms have an incentive to send
credible signals of their strong financial
strength and effective risk management to
convincepotentiallendersoftheirhighquality.
We test whether two distinct attributes of
financial performance—farm profitability (re-
turn on assets) and cash flow—can be used as
signals for differences in their credit risks.
Sustained profitability encourages farmers to
make further investments to expand their
operations or to adopt advanced technology.
These large capital expenditures will induce a
financial deficit that cannot be satisfied by
internal cash flow (CFt, which is composed of
CFt21 and other temporary income in year t)
alone. The financial deficit would be met by
external debts (SDt, LDt), which implies a
simultaneous negative relationship between
cash flow (CFt) and debt (SDt, LDt)i nt h e
pecking order theory. Meanwhile, lagged cash
flow and profitability (CFt21, ROAt21) can be
financial signals that high-quality borrowers
send to lenders, thus helping them to access
loans. This signaling process would be repre-
sented by positive dynamic relationships be-
tween lagged cash flow and profitability
(CFt21, ROAt21) and debt (SDt, LDt).
Similar arguments hold for the investment
and cash flow equations. Lenders make their
lending decisions by distinguishing borrowers
based on the signals of lagged farm profitabil-
ity and laggedcash flow. Since many farmsrely
on external capital for their investment activ-
ities, a positive dynamic interaction between
lagged return on assets (ROAt21) and current
investment (INVt) in the investment equation
implies that profitability is a valid signal that
enables borrowers to gain access to debts and
therefore make further investments. In addi-
tion, subsequent income generated by invest-
ments would result in a positive relationship
between lagged farm profitability (ROAt21)
and cash flow (CFt) in the cash flow equation.
Table 1 summarizes the variables repre-
senting the signaling, pecking order and trade-
off implications and lists the expected signs for
these variables.
Data and Method
The empirical analysis utilizes data from the
Illinois Farm Business Farm Management


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































812 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2008Association (FBFM). The sample contains
crop farms from the years 1997 through 2006
with at least two years of continuous opera-
tion during that period. Farm labors are
generally farmers themselves, supplemented
by a few months of seasonal hired labor. The
land composition is generally 20% of owned
and 80% of leased farmland. Following
Ellinger et al., we include farms with asset
values of at least $40,000 or annual gross farm
income of least $40,000 in order to focus the
analysis on commercial scale farms. As shown
in Table 2, the farms in our sample average
over $1.25 million in assets with an average
debt-to-asset ratio of 0.31 and show consider-
able variation in net cash flow and levels of
debt. Corn and soybeans are the major crops,
usually grown in about equal proportions.
In the simultaneous equation system, the
dependent variables cash flow (CFt), invest-
ment (INVt), short-term debt (SDt), and long-
term debt (LDt) are contemporaneously and
endogenously determined by each other in
each time period. Prior to the estimation, we
must ensure that the equation system is
identifiable. The dynamic model has sets of
predetermined variables, such as lagged cash
flow (CFt21), lagged leverage (SDt21, LDt21),
and lagged investment (INVt21). Though these
variables themselves are not exogenous, they
are predetermined with respect to current
values of endogenous variables; therefore,
they can be considered exogenous. We also
assume that a farm’s return on assets (ROAt)
is exogenously determined by industry char-
acteristics, and that year- and farm-specific
characteristics are exogenous and independent
of the disturbances in the system. Dummy
variables for farm characteristics and time
period are used to control for farm- and time-
specific variations in the data. Lagged stock
short-term debt (SSDt21) and lagged stock
long-term debt (SLDt21) are predetermined in
period t. These exogenous variables and the
lagged endogenous variables are used to
obtain instrumental variables. The equation
system also satisfies the necessary identifica-
tion condition: the number of predetermined
variables excluded from the system is at least
as great as the number of endogenous
variables included less 1. All endogenous
variables can be identified within the equation
system.
The three-stage-least-squares (3SLS) ap-
proach is employed to estimate the parameters;
this method enables us to overcome the
endogeneity problems in the estimation process
and improve the efficiency of parameter
estimates by taking advantage of potential
cross-equation correlation in the residuals. In
thefirst stage, each ofthe endogenous variables
is regressed on all exogenous and predeter-
mined variables to obtain the fitted values for
the endogenous variables; the second stage
least-squares step yields residuals to estimate
the cross-equation correlation matrix; and the
final 3SLS step provides the estimates.
Empirical Results
Aggregate Estimation
Table 3 presents the results of the 3SLS
estimation for all sample farms. These results
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for All Farm Businesses
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Total assets ($) 1,253,716 1,018,202 18,603
Debt-to-asset ratio 0.31 0.23 18,603
Return on assets (%) 4.33 7.86 18,603
Age of operator 51 11 18,603
Net cash flow ($) 29,945 94,896 18,603
Net short-term debt ($) 5,743 55,602 18,603
Net long-term debt ($) 9,191 77,514 18,603
Total investment ($) 32,511 46,261 18,603
Notes: Net short- and long-term debt are measured as the difference between the end- and beginning-of-year stock variables to
obtain flow measures of each year’s financial performance, and dollar amounts are in current dollars.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































814 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2008provide strong evidence that the signaling
theory presents another important dimension
in studying the agricultural lender-borrower
relationship and farm capital structure. The
parameter estimates for the signaling effects
indicate that farm businesses employ financial
signals, such as previous cash flow and
profitability (CFt21, ROAt21) to expand their
credit capacity. Since farm investment is
generally large and cannot be carried out
solely by internal cash flow, the resulting
financial deficit is met by borrowing an
amount equal or above total investment
expenditure less the cash flow from the current
year. As the pecking order theory predicts,
debt (SDt, LDt) and cash flow (CFt) exhibit a
simultaneously negative relationship.
As predicted, lagged cash income and
profitability are valid signals for lenders to
assess a borrower’s credit ability during his
debt application. Farms with credible signals
in terms of these variables will have access to
greater credit in the following year. Thus,
lagged cash flow and profitability (CFt21,
ROAt21) should have positive dynamic rela-
tionships with debt variables (SDt, LDt). In
the short-term debt equation, the positive
coefficients on lagged cash flow and lagged
return on assets are consistent with the
signaling theory: when borrowing is compet-
itive in the capital market, high-quality farms
tend to present valid evidence to lenders about
their low credit risk and obtain greater loans.
A higher return on assets (ROAt21)i nt h e
previous year promotes farms to increase their
investment (INVt) in the following year, which
shows a coefficient of 0.0049 in the investment
equation. Past profitability also results in an
increased cash flow, represented in the cash
flow equation by a dynamic relationship
between the lagged return on assets (ROAt21)
and the current period cash flow (CFt).
The negative ‘‘endogenous trade-off’’ coef-
ficients of long-term debt (LDt) in the short-
term debt equation and of short-term debt
(SDt) in the long-term debt equation indicate
that farms balance different debt maturities,
trying to maintain an appropriate debt struc-
ture. To examine a farm’s ‘‘exogenous adjust-
ment’’ performance, the positive significant
coefficients for stock short-term debt and
stock long-term debt (SSDt21, SLDt21)d e m -
onstrate that farms partially adjust their debt
levels to prevent large deviations from target
leverage ratios.
Furthermore, the negative coefficients for
short- and long-term debt (SDt, LDt)i nt h e
cash flow equation support the simple version
of the pecking order theory. A farm that
generates more cash flow would borrow less,
because using debt is more costly than
employing internal equity as a source of
financing. Similarly, short-term debt is slightly
preferred to long-term debt due to its lower
borrowing costs. This relationship is illustrat-
ed by comparing the absolute values of the
coefficients for short-term debt (20.4738) and
long-term debt (20.4684) in the cash flow
equation. Therefore, short-term debt has a
slightly greater impact on cash flow than long-
term debt. We also try to explore Myers’s
complex version of the pecking order theory in
the investment equation. Myers suggests that,
in order to avoid larger financing costs for
future projects, farmers keep lower current
leverage levels, thus implying a dynamic
negative relationship between investment
(INVt)a tt i m et and short- and long-term
debt (SDt21, LDt21)a tt i m et21. The
regression results support such arguments for
the long-term debt, but the coefficient for the
short-term debt is not significant.
Group Estimation
All farms are disaggregated into age and credit
risk groups in order to further explore how the
signaling theory as well as the pecking order
and trade-off theories apply to different types
of farms. The group approach is used instead
of entering variables directly for age in order
to sharpen the differences between the farms
and to observe the effects on other simulta-
neous relationships among the variables. We
first define the youngest one third of farm
observations (under age 46) over the time
period as ‘‘young farmers’’ and the older one
third (over age 55) as ‘‘old farmers.’’ Barry,
Bierlen, and Sotomayor argued that ‘‘old
farmers should be less financially constrained
Zhao, Barry, and Katchova: Signaling Credit Risk in Agriculture 815than young farmers because they may have
longer relationships with lenders, greater
equity accumulations, and generally stronger
financial measures.’’ Their results indicated
that young farmers adhere more strongly to
the pecking order theory than do old farmers.
We hypothesize that old farmers tend to
operate high-quality farms that generate more
cash flow and higher profitability. In the
presence of asymmetric information and a
competitive capital market, old farmers would
therefore have greater capacities to send
financial signals that enable them to acquire
more debt.
Based on the analysis described above, we
reestimate the model with the two age groups
considered separately. Table 4 shows the
econometric results. Consistent with Barry,
Bierlen, and Sotomayor’s study, our estimates
show those young farmers follow the pecking
order theory more closely than old farmers.
This relationship is indicated by the negative
significant coefficients on short- and long-term
debt for young farmers in the cash flow
equation, while the long-term debt coefficient
is insignificant for old farmers.
Signaling function would help good quality
farms to more easily access debt. Our results
imply that old farmers employ previous cash
flow and profitability as financing signals to
expand their debt. In contrast, young farmers
may only depend on previous profitability and
cash flow to persuade lenders for short-term
loans: those financial indexes are less convinc-
ing for them to get long-term debt. This is
indicated by the insignificant coefficients of
lagged cash flow in the young farmers’ long-
term debt equation, whereas these coefficients
are significant for old farmers. The positive
relationships between debt variables and
signaling instruments for old farmers suggest
that previous cash flow and profitability are
valid signals to facilitate their debt applica-
tion.
The endogenous trade-off variables indi-
cate that old farmers, depending on their
longer farming experience, could more quickly
regulate their short- and long-term debt
internally to reach an appropriate debt struc-
ture. This conclusion draws from the signifi-
cant larger absolute coefficients in the short-
term debt (20.7455) and long-term debt
(20.5653) equations from old farmers. In
addition, old farmers follow the trade-off
theory in adjusting both short- and long-term
debt toward their target levels. In contrast,
young farmers show significant adjustment
only toward the target for long-term debt.
The credit scoring model considers finan-
cial ratios recommended by the Farm Finan-
cial Standards Council, which represent a
farm’s solvency, repayment capacity, profit-
ability, liquidity, and financial efficiency.
Solvency and repayment capacity are weighted
more heavily than the other variables. Each
farm is assigned a calculated credit score and
is classified into one of the five rating classes
(from class 1 to class 5), with a lower credit
class implying a better financial situation for
the farm. We combine farms ranked into
classes 1 and 2 into a low credit risk group due
to their similar financial characteristics, while
those in classes 4 and 5 are included in the
high credit risk group. Middle class 3 is
omitted to obtain greater differences in the
credit risk groups. Reclassification occurs
annually.
The results from estimating the two credit
risk groups are presented in Table 5, which
indicates that farms in a strong financial
position have greater access to credit than
farms in a poor financial situation. This is
reflected in the positive dynamic coefficients
for lagged cash flow and profitability (CFt21,
ROAt21) in the debt equations for low credit
risk farms (except for ROAt in long-term debt)
and in the insignificance of these relationships
for the high credit risk farms. Effective
signaling in the borrower-lender relationship
enables low credit risk farms to be more
financially flexible than those farms with
higher credit risk, as evidenced by significant
coefficients of previous cash flow (CFt21)i n
both debt equations, and past return on assets
(ROAt21) in the short-term debt equation for
low credit risk farms. In contrast, none of
those coefficients indicate significant signs for
high credit risk farms.
Finally, the credit group study reveals that
only low credit risk farms follow the simple











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































818 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2008version of the pecking order theory, where
their short-term debt has a greater impact on
cash flow than does long-term debt. High
credit risk farm financing does not completely
follow the pecking order theory, as evidenced
by a larger long-term debt effect on cash flow
than that of short-term debt. This result could
occur because high credit risk farms generate
less cash income in the short run and
experience greater financial burdens from
repayment of long-term debt than do low
credit risk farms.
Conclusions
This study has conceptualized and tested the
joint effects of the signaling, pecking order,
and trade-off theories on farm capital struc-
ture. Regression results from the aggregate
estimation confirm that, under asymmetric
information, effective signaling behavior in the
lender-borrower relationship works well with
the pecking order and trade-off theories to
influence farm capital structure. The most
robust findings are that farm businesses tend
to employ previous cash flow and profitability
as financial signals to expand their credit
capacity in the competitive capital markets.
The simple version of Myers’s (1984) pecking
order theory is confirmed by our study. The
empirical results indicate that farm businesses
adjust their leverage ratios over time accord-
ing to exogenous economic conditions as well
as farms’ endogenous capital structures.
The age group investigation suggests that
old farmers, generally in a strong financial
position, send effective financial signals to
facilitate their access to debt. Young farmers
more strongly follow the pecking order theory
in their financing process. The trade-off theory
results indicate old farmers are more experi-
enced in balancing short- and long-term debt
internally, while young farmers have less
flexibilitytoadjust to theirexternaldebttargets
aswellasinternallybalancetheirdebtstructure.
The credit risk group comparison shows that
lowcreditriskfarmscanbettersignaltolenders
about their advantageous financial positions.
The insights gained from exploring the
signaling theory concurrently with the pecking
order and the trade-off theories benefit both
parties in the agricultural credit relationship.
The signaling effects encourage high quality
agricultural borrowers to send credible signals
to facilitate their farm loans. Since past
financial performance, such as profitability
and cash flow measure, is considered as a valid
signal, it promotes farm operators to keep
organized financial reports and otherwise
improve farm financial management. The
lenders, on one hand, could effectively identify
borrowers’ credit risk through credible signals.
On the other hand, the demonstration of the
coexistence of the signaling, pecking order,
and trade-off theories in farm businesses
enables lenders to better understand the farm
financing patterns in the short run as well as in
the long run.
[Received August 2007; Accepted March 2008.]
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